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Trial Practice and Procedure
Brandon L. Peak*
Joseph M. Colwell**
Christopher B. McDaniel***
Rory A. Weeks****
Daniel E. Philyaw*****
L’Zandra V. Jones******
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses selected opinions and legislation of interest to
the Georgia civil trial practitioner issued during the Survey period 1 of
this publication.2

*Partner,

Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. The Citadel (B.S., summa cum laude, 2001); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**Associate, Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. Mercer University (B.A., cum laude, 2010); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***Associate, Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. Columbus State University (B.A., summa cum
laude, 2010); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2014). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
****Associate, Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. University of Georgia (A.B., cum laude, 2008);
University of Georgia (M.A., 2012); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., magna cum
laude, 2013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*****Associate, Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. University of Missouri (B.S., magna cum laude,
2014); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2018). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
******Associate, Butler Wooten & Peak LLP. Georgia State University (B.A., 2016); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2020). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia trial practice and procedure during the prior Survey
period, see Brandon L. Peak et al., Trial Practice and Procedure, Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 71 MERCER L. REV. 305 (2019).
2. The Authors wish to credit and give special thanks to Elizabeth N. McBride, a
rising third-year student at Mercer University School of Law, who worked as a summer law
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II. LEGISLATION
7143

House Bill
amended O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1—which applies to
insurance demand letters arising out of motor vehicle wreck claims—to
impose new requirements on claimants under that statute. Significantly,
House Bill 714 revised the statute to apply to pre-answer offers of
settlement in motor vehicle wreck cases, rather than to offers of
settlement prior to filing an action. Settlement offers must now include
all records, medical or otherwise, in the offeror’s possession that were
incurred as a result of the subject claim. Additionally, settlement offers
may now include a term requiring that “the recipient shall provide the
offeror a statement, under oath, regarding whether all liability and
casualty insurance issued by the recipient that,” does or may provide
coverage for “the claim at issue has been disclosed to the offeror.” 4
Payment deadlines may not be more than forty days from receipt of the
offer, which is changed from the current deadline of ten days from the
date of written acceptance.5
House Bill 714 also amended the provisions related to the liability and
penalties that an insurer will face upon refusal to pay an insured for any
loss pursuant to uninsured motorist coverage under motor vehicle
liability policies.6 Now, penalties for refusals made in bad faith are
increased to not more than 25% of the recovery or $25,000.00, whichever
is greater, and all reasonable attorney’s fees for the prosecution of the
case.7
Senate Bill 234 created the Georgia Uniform Mediation Act, meant to
provide uniformity in the laws governing mediation, its participants, and
communication during mediation. 8 The bill adds Chapter 17 to Title 9,
which defines terms relating to mediation,9 specifies which
communications made during a mediation are privileged and not subject

clerk with Butler Wooten & Peak LLP and whose contributions to and work on this Article
were invaluable.
3. Ga. H.R. Bill 714, Reg. Sess. (2021) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67.1 (2021) and
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 (2021)).
4. Id. at § 1(a)(3) (codified at O.C.G.A § 9-11-67.1(a)(1)(3) (2021)).
5. Id. at § 1(g) (codified at O.C.G.A § 9-11-67.1(g) (2021)).
6. Id. at § 2
7. Id. at § 2(j) (House Bill 714 applies to all causes of action accruing on or after July
1, 2021).
8. Ga. S. Bill 234, Reg. Sess. (2021) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 9-17-1, 9-17-3, 9-17-3, 917-4, 9-17-5 (2021)).
9. O.C.G.A. § 9-17-1 (2021).
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to discovery or admissible in evidence,10 how to waive the privilege,11 and
when the privilege does not apply.12
III. CASE LAW
A. Apportionment
Georgia’s appellate courts issued several significant opinions affecting
the law of apportionment in this state during the Survey period.
In Johns v. Suzuki Motor of America, Inc.,13 the plaintiffs asserted
claims of strict products liability based on design defect and negligence
against the manufacturer and distributor of a motorcycle when the
motorcycle’s front brake failed and the plaintiff–operator was injured.14
At trial, the evidence showed that the brake failure was caused by a
defect in the design of the front master brake cylinder, which created a
corrosive condition and misdirected the flow of brake fluid. However, the
plaintiff-operator admitted that contrary to instructions in the
motorcycle owner’s manual to replace the brake fluid every two years, he
had not changed the brake fluid in the eight years he owned the
motorcycle. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on all claims but
apportioned 51% of fault to the defendants and 49% of fault to the
plaintiff-operator.15 Based on Georgia’s apportionment statute, O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33(a),16 the trial court reduced the jury’s award of damages. 17 The
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.18
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to decide whether
subsection (a) of Georgia’s apportionment statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33,19
applies to a strict products liability claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11.20 The
court ultimately held that strict products liability claims are subject to
apportionment under the statute.21 The court opined that the broad
language of the apportionment statute “governs actions ‘for injury to

10. O.C.G.A. § 9-17-3 (2021).
11. O.C.G.A. § 9-17-4 (2021).
12. O.C.G.A. § 9-17-5 (2021).
13. 310 Ga. 159, 850 S.E.2d 59 (2020).
14. Id. at 160, 850 S.E.2d at 61.
15. Id.
16. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(a) (2021).
17. Johns, 310 Ga. at 160, 850 S.E.2d at 61.
18. Id. at 161, 850 S.E.2d at 61 (citing Suzuki Motor of America v. Johns, 351 Ga. App.
186, 198, 830 S.E.2d 549, 560 (2019)).
19. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33 (2021).
20. Johns, 310 Ga. at 159–60, 850 S.E.2d at 60; O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 (2021).
21. Johns, 310 Ga. at 160, 850 S.E.2d at 60.
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person,’ without in any way distinguishing between the theories upon
which those claims are premised.”22 Thus, strict products liability claims
fall within the apportionment statute’s ambit. 23
The court rejected arguments that an exception for strict products
liability claims should be read into the apportionment statute because of
case law prior to its enactment holding that principles of comparative
negligence do not apply to such claims. The court held that this precedent
was supplanted when the statute was enacted. The court further
disapproved of the court of appeals decision in Patterson v. Long,24 which
followed after the enactment of the apportionment statute, “to the extent
[it] indicates that the decisions prohibiting the application of comparative
negligence to strict products liability claims survived the 2005
enactment” as well as federal court decisions with similar holdings.25 The
court emphasized that
permitting comparative negligence to be applied to strict products
liability claims does not, however, mean the end of strict products
liability[,] . . . . [since] [p]laintiffs raising strict products liability
claims will still generally be relieved of the burden of showing that the
injury-causing product defect was the result of the manufacturer’s
negligence.26

The court explained that “considering a plaintiff’s responsibility[,] [or
fault,] for an injury does not require proof of the manufacturer’s
negligence.”27 And though the court recognized that comparing a
plaintiff’s fault with a product defect is difficult, the court expressed its
“faith in the ability of juries to compare disparate types of fault.” 28
In Quynn v. Hulsey,29 the administrator of the estate of a man struck
and killed by a truck brought a wrongful death action against the driver
of the truck and his employer, the owner of the truck. The trial court
granted partial summary judgment to the driver’s employer on the
plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages and for negligent hiring, training,
and supervision based on the employer’s admissions of respondeat
22. Id. at 162, 850 S.E.2d at 62 (quoting Suzuki Motor of Am. Inc., 351 Ga. App. at 198,
830 S.E.2d at 560).
23. Id. at 162, 850 S.E.2d at 62.
24. 321 Ga. App. 157, 741 S.E.2d 242 (2013).
25. Johns, 310 Ga. at 165–66, 850 S.E.2d at 64.
26. Id. at 167, 850 S.E.2d at 65; see also Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 594, 774
S.E.2d 688, 693 (2015) (stating that O.C.G.A. §§ 55-12-33(a) and (g) “codify the doctrine of
comparative negligence”).
27. Johns, 310 Ga. at 167–68, 850 S.E.2d at 66.
28. Id. at 168, 850 S.E.2d at 66.
29. 310 Ga. 473, 850 S.E.2d 725 (2020).
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superior. After a trial on the plaintiff’s remaining negligence claims, the
jury found the driver and his employer 50% at fault and the decedent
50% at fault, thereby precluding the plaintiff from recovering damages.
The plaintiff appealed, contending that the trial court erred in granting
partial summary judgment to the employer on its claims for negligent
entrustment, hiring, training, and supervision. But the
Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument
that the apportionment statute required the trier of fact to consider the
fault of all persons who contributed to the injury.30
The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding that the
apportionment statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33,31 abrogated the decisional
law rule that an “employer is entitled to summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s claims for negligent entrustment, hiring, training, supervision,
and retention” if it concedes “it will be vicariously liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior if its employee is found negligent,” the
“Respondeat Superior Rule.”32 The court reasoned that the
apportionment statute requires the trier of fact to assess the relative
fault of all those who contributed to the plaintiff’s injury and apportion
the damages based on that assessment of relative fault. 33 But,
“[a]dherence to the Respondeat Superior Rule would preclude the jury
from apportioning fault to the employer for negligent entrustment,
hiring, training, supervision, and retention” claims.34 Thus, the court
concluded that “the Respondeat Superior Rule is inconsistent with the
plain language of the apportionment statute,” 35 and, since “statutes
trump cases[,]”36 the apportionment statute required the elimination of
the Respondeat Superior Rule.37
In dissent, Justice McMillian opined that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33,38 which
apportions fault at the verdict stage, was compatible with “the
Respondeat Superior Rule when it is applied to dismiss claims before
trial.”39 Justice McMillian pointed to the court’s opinion in Loudermilk,
where the court noted that other legal theories, such as vicarious liability
30. Id. at 473–74, 850 S.E.2d at 727.
31. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.
32. Quynn, 310 Ga. at 474–75, 482, 850 S.E.2d at 727, 732 (emphasis added) (quoting
Hosp. Auth. v. Fender, 342 Ga. App. 13, 21, 802 S.E.2d 346, 354 (2017)).
33. Id. at 476, 850 S.E.2d at 728–29.
34. Id. at 477, 850 S.E.2d at 729.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 364, 729 S.E.2d 378, 382
(2012)).
37. Id. at 481, 850 S.E.2d at 732.
38. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33.
39. Quynn, 310 Ga. at 484, 850 S.E.2d at 733 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
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or other agency-based or derivative theories of liability, may preclude
division of fault as a matter of law such that the apportionment statute
does not apply.40 Justice McMillian also referenced persuasive authority
from courts in other states that had determined the Respondeat Superior
Rule was compatible with similar apportionment statutes. 41
In Atlanta Women’s Specialists, LLC v. Trabue,42 the Supreme Court
of Georgia re-affirmed the general rule “that a defendant must file a
notice of nonparty fault naming any nonparty upon whose fault the
defendant seeks apportionment of damages.”43 In Trabue, the plaintiffs
asserted a medical malpractice action against Atlanta Women’s
Specialists (AWS) and Dr. Stanley Angus after Shannon Trabue
sustained a catastrophic brain injury.44 The complaint alleged negligence
and asserted that AWS was vicariously liable for the actions of Dr. Angus
and a nonparty physician, Dr. Simonsen, both of whom were employees
of AWS.45
At trial, Dr. Angus sought to have the jury apportion fault between
him and Dr. Simonsen and then to apportion damages between him and
AWS.46 Neither Dr. Angus nor AWS filed a pretrial notice of nonparty
fault with respect to Dr. Simonsen pursuant to the apportionment
statute.47 Accordingly, the trial court denied counsel’s “request to require
the jury to apportion damages between Dr. Angus and AWS based on the
percentages of fault of Dr. Angus,” and the nonparty physician.48 The jury
awarded a nearly $46,000,000 verdict in favor of the plaintiffs.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a new
trial on the issue of apportionment. 49 Upon review, the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed the grant of a new trial, and the Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed.50
The court held that Dr. Angus was required to comply with the
nonparty pretrial notice rule to obtain apportionment of damages
40. Id. at 484, 850 S.E.2d at 734 (McMillian, J., dissenting) (citing FDIC v. Loudermilk,
305 Ga. 558, 575 n.20, 826 S.E.2d 116, 129 n.20 (2019)).
41. Id. at 485–86, 850 S.E.2d at 734–35 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
42. 310 Ga. 331, 850 S.E.2d 748 (2020).
43. Id. at 342, 850 S.E.2d at 757.
44. Id. at 331, 850 S.E.2d at 751.
45. Id. at 335, 850 S.E.2d at 753.
46. Id. at 331–332, 850 S.E.2d at 751.
47. Id. at 332, 850 S.E.2d at 751.
48. Id. (Where defendants asked for apportionment of damages under
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b), resulting in a denial by the trial court, which relied on
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d)).
49. Id. at 332, 850 S.E.2d at 751.
50. Id. at 333, 341–42, 850 S.E.2d at 752, 757.
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between him and AWS—whose fault was partially predicated on the
conduct of Dr. Simonsen.51 Dr. Angus contended that subsection O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-33(b)52 was applicable and argued that the jury should “apportion
damages between him and AWS based on his own percentage of fault and
the percentage of fault of Dr. Simonsen.” 53 The court disagreed and
reasoned that a nonparty cannot be liable for damages under the
statute’s language.54 Dr. Angus was required to comply with the 120-day
notice of nonparty fault requirement, and the fact that AWS’s liability
was predicated, in part, under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the
acts of another employee not named as a defendant did not relieve Dr.
Angus of this responsibility under the apportionment statute. 55
B. Choice of Law
In Auld v. Forbes,56 the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether
Georgia’s or Belize’s statute of limitations applied to a wrongful death
action arising from an incident in Belize but filed in Georgia.57 In Auld,
fourteen-year-old Tomari Jackson drowned while swimming in a river on
a school trip in Belize. Jackson’s mother, Adell Forbes, filed suit in
Georgia after Belize’s one-year limitation period for wrongful death had
run. The trial court found that Forbes’s claims were time-barred under
Belize law, but the court of appeals reversed, holding instead that
Georgia’s two-year statute of limitations on wrongful death claims
applied.58 On review, the supreme court reversed and held that Belize’s
statute of limitations applied to the plaintiff’s claim. 59
The court observed that Georgia law differentiates between
substantive and procedural law and determines which law will apply
through the doctrines of lex loci delicti and lex fori, respectively.60 Under
the lex loci delicti doctrine, tort actions are governed by the substantive
law of the forum where the last event necessary to make the defendants
liable occurred. Although the trip was planned in Georgia, the court
reasoned that “‘last event necessary to make the defendants liable . . . —

51. Id. at 339, 850 S.E.2d at 755. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(d) provides procedural
requirements for the 120-day nonparty pretrial notice rule.
52. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b).
53. Trabue, 310 Ga. at 338, 850 S.E.2d at 755.
54. Id. at 339, 850 S.E.2d at 755–56.
55. Id. at 340, 850 S.E.2d at 756.
56. 309 Ga. 893, 848 S.E.2d 876 (2020).
57. Id. at 893, 848 S.E.2d at 878.
58. Forbes v. Auld, 351 Ga. App. 555, 555 830 S.E.2d 770, 771 (2019).
59. Auld, 309 Ga. at 894, 848 S.E.2d at 879.
60. Id.
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that is, Jackson’s drowning—took place in Belize, and that Belize was
where the injury was suffered.”61 The court also noted that statutes of
limitations are generally procedural and are thus governed by the
doctrine of lex fori, or the law of the forum. The doctrine of lex loci will
govern, however, “where the foreign statute creating a cause of action not
known to the common law prescribes a shorter [limitations] period . . .
than that prescribed by the law of the [forum.]”62 Since wrongful death
claims are statutory in nature, and the Belize limitations period was
shorter than Georgia’s, the court concluded the limitation period in Belize
governs.63
The supreme court noted that while Georgia recognizes a public policy
exception to lex loci delicti,64 a mere difference in law did not justify the
use of the exception here.65 Moreover, the court held, Georgia’s wrongful
death statute provides no remedy for an extraterritorial death because
Georgia’s Wrongful Death Act has long been understood to not have
extraterritorial application.66 Therefore, the court disagreed with Forbes
that Belize’s measure of damages is so dissimilar to Georgia’s that
Georgia courts should substitute Georgia law,67 thus overruling Carroll
Fulmer Logistics Corp. v. Hines,68 which held that a difference in the
measure of damages for a wrongful death violated Georgia’s public
policy.69
C. Discovery
In General Motors, LLC v. Buchanan,70 the Court of Appeals of Georgia
declined to adopt the Apex Doctrine as the rule of law in Georgia and

61. Id. at 895, 848 S.E.2d at 879.
62. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Murray, 231 Ga. 852, 853, 204 S.E.2d 747, 748 (1974)).
63. Id. at 895, 848 S.E.2d at 880.
64. See Coon v. Medical Center, Inc., 300 Ga. 722, 727, 797 S.E.2d 828, 832 (2017) (“the
Georgia court will not apply the law of the place where the injury was sustained if it would
conflict with Georgia’s public policy”).
65. Auld, 309 Ga. at 896, 848 S.E.2d at 880 (“the public policy exception applies only if
the out-of-state law is so ‘radically dissimilar to anything existing in our own system of
jurisprudence’ that it would ‘seriously contravene’ the policy embodied in Georgia law.”)
(citing Southern Ry. Co. v. Decker, 5 Ga. App. 21, 25, 29, 62 S.E.2d 678, 680, 682 (1908)).
66. Id. at 896, 848 S.E.2d at 881 (“[A]lthough wrongful death claims recognized under
Belize law provide a somewhat different remedy than wrongful death claims brought under
Georgia law and have a shorter limitation period, Belize’s wrongful death law is not so
radically dissimilar that it cannot be applied by Georgia courts”).
67. Id. at 898, 848 S.E.2d at 881–82.
68. 309 Ga. App. 695, 710 S.E.2d 888 (2011).
69. Id. at 697–98, 710 S.E.2d at 891.
70. 359 Ga. App. 412, 858 S.E.2d 102 (2021).
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affirmed the trial court’s order allowing the deposition of General Motors,
LLC’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to move forward. 71 In the course of
the underlying product liability lawsuit, the plaintiff, Robert Buchanan,
requested to take the deposition of Mary Barra, the CEO of defendant
General Motors, LLC (GM).72 GM filed a motion for protective order in
an effort to prevent Barra from being deposed. The trial court denied
GM’s motion, which led to GM’s interlocutory appeal to the court of
appeals.73
The court concluded that the information Buchanan sought to obtain
through the deposition of GM’s CEO was both relevant and reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as required by
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26.74 The court declined GM’s urging to adopt the Apex
Doctrine—a rule of law adopted in some jurisdictions which imposes
special requirements upon parties seeking to depose an “Apex” employee
of a corporate defendant, such as the CEO—concluding that the Apex
Doctrine “is inconsistent with Georgia’s discovery provisions that require
a liberal construction in favor of supplying a party with facts.” 75
D. Motions in Limine
The Georgia appellate courts issued two significant opinions on
motions in limine (MILs) during the Survey period. It is pertinent to note
for these discussions that there are generally two types of MILs. The first
seeks a “final ruling on the admissibility of evidence” usually pretrial
though sometimes during trial.76 The second seeks “to prevent the
mention of certain evidence or an area of inquiry until its admissibility
can be determined during trial outside the presence of the jury.” 77 Trial
courts do not have to rule on MILs without the contextual benefit of trial.

71. Id. at 412, 858 S.E.2d at 103–04. General Motors, LLC filed a petition for writ of
certiorari to the Georgia Supreme Court on June 9, 2021. The petition remained pending
at the time this article was submitted for publishing.
72. Id., at 413, 858 S.E.2d at 104.
73. Id. at 414, 858 S.E.2d at 105.
74. Id. at 416, 858 S.E.2d at 106; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26 (2021).
75. Buchanan, 359 Ga. App. at 418, 858 S.E.2d at 107 (noting that no Georgia state
appellate court has ever applied the Apex Doctrine).
76. Williams v. Harvey, 311 Ga. 439, 442, 858 S.E.2d 479, 484 (2021); see Walton v.
Datry, 185 Ga. App. 88, 90–91, 363 S.E.2d 295, 298 (1987) (“In a broad sense the term
[motion in limine] refers ‘to any motion, whether made before or during trial, to exclude
anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered,’” and such a motion
may be made orally or in writing) (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2
(1984)).
77. Williams, 311 Ga. at 442, 858 S.E.2d at 484.
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But if they do, that ruling controls the action going forward, though
discretion remains to modify the ruling at trial.78
The first significant case concerns cross-examination questions that
violated a trial court’s pretrial MIL rulings but where no
contemporaneous objection to the violation was made at trial. For over
150 years, Georgia has embraced the contemporary objection rule, which
requires counsel to object to a perceived error “at the earliest possible
opportunity in the progress of the case” to preserve the purported error
for appellate review.79 Yet starting in 1979, the Supreme Court of
Georgia held that when a MIL to exclude certain evidence is denied, the
moving party need not object at trial to preserve the issue for appellate
review.80 Three years later, the supreme court extended that rule to MIL
rulings granting a request to exclude certain evidence. Ultimately,
according to the supreme court, those rules were extended from evidence
to argument by the court of appeals.81
In Kennison v. Mayfield,82 the Georgia Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, issued a nearly unanimous opinion—twelve judges concurred in
full, and one judge concurred in the judgment—holding that “absent a
contemporaneous objection that . . . counsel was violating the ruling in
limine, the mere grant[ing] of [party’s] motions in limine did not preserve
error for appellate review.” 83 In reaching this conclusion, the court of
appeals distinguished one of its recent decisions, Harvey v. Williams,84
which dealt with the possibility of a pretrial MIL ruling preserving for
appellate review the issue whether counsel’s purported violation of that
ruling during closing argument constituted reversible error despite the
lack of a contemporaneous objection.85
After Kennison, it is now clear that counsel cannot let violations of MIL
rulings on evidence pass without contemporaneous objection at trial and
then pursue a reversal on appeal based on that violation. 86 But a different
rule applied to violations of MIL rulings on argument that passed
78. Id. at 443, 858 S.E.2d at 484; see State v. Botts, 346 Ga. App. 227, 227, 816 S.E.2d
103, 104 (2018) (“Of course, [t]he trial court has the discretion to modify its rulings on a
motion in limine at any time[.]”).
79. Williams, 311 Ga. at 442, 858 S.E.2d at 484 (quoting Sharpe v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp.,
267 Ga. 267, 267, 476 S.E.2d 722, 723 (1996)).
80. Id. at 443, 858 S.E.2d at 484.
81. Id. at 443, 858 S.E.2d at 485.
82. 359 Ga. App. 52, 856 S.E.2d 738 (2021) (en banc).
83. Id. at 60, 856 S.E.2d at 745.
84. 354 Ga. App. 766, 841 S.E.2d 386 (2020), rev’d by Williams v. Harvey, 311 Ga. 439,
858 S.E.2d 479 (2021).
85. Kennison, 359 Ga. App. at 60 n.11, 856 S.E.2d at 745 n.11.
86. Id. at 60–61, 856 S.E.2d at 745–46.
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without contemporaneous objection at trial under the court of appeals’
opinion in Harvey v. Williams.87 That confusing anomaly was corrected
two months later by the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Writing for a unanimous court in Williams v. Harvey, Justice Carla
McMillian first outlined the history of the contemporaneous objection
rule and the Georgia case law that had created an exception to the
contemporaneous objection rule for MIL rulings on both evidence and
argument.88 Justice McMillian then examined the relationship between
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-103,89 and its federal analogue, Federal Rule of Evidence
103,90 and held that Georgia Rule 103 is “specifically patterned” on
Federal Rule 103.91 Reemphasizing that when a provision of Georgia’s
current Evidence Code is materially similar to a federal rule, Georgia
courts looked to federal appellate courts’ interpretation of the federal
rule, specifically the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and
the U.S. Supreme Court. The court held that the adoption of O.C.G.A.
§ 24-4-103 abrogated Georgia case law, holding that “no
contemporaneous objection is required to preserve the alleged error when
a party violates . . . a ruled-upon motion in limine” about “the
admissibility of evidence” at trial.92 This decision imprinted the Supreme
Court of Georgia’s stamp of approval on the Georgia Court of Appeals’
holding in Kennison.
While acknowledging that O.C.G.A. § 24-1-103 “applies only to
evidence,” the supreme court held that there is “no reason why this
rationale should not equally apply to statements made by counsel during
opening statements and closing arguments.”93 The court noted three
reasons why it makes sense to extend the rule to MIL rulings reaching
opening statements and closing arguments. 94 First, opening statements
and closing arguments must be based on the evidence that was or will be
presented at trial.95 Second, requiring parties to make contemporaneous
objections to supposed violations of MIL rulings “further[s] the purpose
of the contemporaneous objection rule—to afford an opportunity for the
trial court to remediate error at the time it is made.”96 Third, a

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Williams, 311 Ga. at 443, 858 S.E.2d at 484, 485.
Id. at 442–43, 858 S.E.2d at 484–85.
O.C.G.A. § 24-1-103.
FED. R. EVID. r. 103 (2021).
Id. at 445, 858 S.E.2d at 486.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 445–46, 858 S.E.2d at 486.
Id. at 445, 858 S.E.2d at 486.
Id. at 446, 858 S.E.2d at 486.
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contemporaneous objection is required to preserve for appellate review
the issue of a violation of a MIL ruling in the Eleventh Circuit and other
federal appellate courts.97
In sum, the rule in Georgia is now clear: “[A] contemporaneous
objection must be made at the time an alleged violation of a ruled-upon
motion in limine occurs at trial—whether during the presentation of
evidence or in opening statements or arguments made by counsel before
the factfinder—in order to preserve the error for appeal.”98
E. Municipal Liability
In Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company v. City of College Park,99 the
Court of Appeals of Georgia held that the City of College Park’s sovereign
immunity was waived up to the amount of insurance coverage purchased
by the City with respect to certain motor vehicle negligence claims,
despite endorsements contained in the insurance policy purporting to
preserve the City’s sovereign immunity. 100 The plaintiffs in the
underlying case filed a wrongful death suit against the City alleging the
City’s police recklessly pursued a vehicle which proximately caused the
motor vehicle wreck that killed three people.101
At the time of the wreck, the City had two insurance policies issued by
Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company (Atlantic) with a combined
coverage amount of $5,000,000.102 Atlantic intervened in the underlying
lawsuit for the purpose of arguing that the City’s policy limits were
capped at $700,000 based on policy language preserving the City’s
sovereign immunity for liability exceeding the statutory waiver amounts
set forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2.103 The trial court disagreed, “finding as a
matter of law the limits of the policy issued to the City are $5,000,000.” 104
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and noted that the
General Assembly intended “to increase compensation for those who

97. Id. at 446, 858 S.E.2d at 486–87.
98. Id. at 447, 858 S.E.2d at 487.
99. 357 Ga. App. 556, 851 S.E.2d 189 (2020).
100. Id. at 565, 851 S.E.2d at 195–96. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Atlantic’s
Petition for Writ of Certiorari on July 7, 2021. The issue before the supreme court is
whether “the City’s insurance policy waive[s] the City’s sovereign immunity under OCGA
§ 36-92-2(d)(3).” cert. granted, Atl. Specialty Ins. Co. v. City of Coll. Park, No. S21C0482,
2021 Ga. LEXIS 564 (Jul. 7, 2021). This question remained pending at the time this article
was submitted to be published.
101. Atlantic, 357 Ga. App. at 557, 851 S.E.2d at 191.
102. Id. at 557–58, 851 S.E.2d at 191.
103. Id. at 561–62, 851 S.E.2d at 193; O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2 (2021).
104. Atlantic, 357 Ga. App. at 559, 851 S.E.2d at 192.
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sustain injuries arising out of the use of a government motor vehicle.” 105
The court of appeals further noted that Atlantic’s interpretation of the
policy endorsement would be “counter to the General Assembly’s clear
legislative intent.”106
F. Product Liability
In Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc.,107 the Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of a design defect claim against
Snapchat.108 The plaintiffs asserted a design defect claim against
Snapchat for its Speed Filter109 after the plaintiffs suffered injuries when
a distracted driver crashed into the rear of the plaintiffs’ vehicle. 110 The
plaintiffs alleged that “Snapchat negligently designed the Speed Filter,
encouraging users to endanger themselves and others on the roadway.”111
The trial court dismissed the claim, finding that Snapchat owed no duty
to the plaintiffs, and the court of appeals affirmed. 112
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that they sufficiently alleged a
duty under the applicable design defect risk-utility balancing test.113 The
court of appeals noted that a plaintiff has an obligation to identify a legal
duty before the court would apply the risk-utility balancing test.114
Further, the court noted that “[u]nder Georgia law, there is no ‘general
legal duty to all the world not to subject others to an unreasonable risk
of harm.’”115 The general rule is that “there is no duty to control the
conduct of third persons to prevent them from causing physical harm to
105. Id. at 563, 851 S.E.2d at 194.
106. Id.
107. 357 Ga. App. 496, 851 S.E.2d 128, cert. granted, Maynard v. Snapchat, Inc., No.
S21C0555, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 547 (July 07, 2021). This case is assigned to the October 2021
Oral Argument calendar of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
108. Maynard, 357 Ga. App. at 497, 851 S.E.2d at 130.
109. Id. at 497–98, 851 S.E.2d at 130. (The Speed Filter “allows Snapchat users to record
their speed and overlay that speed onto a Snapchat photo or video.”) Id. at 497, 851 S.E.2d
at 130. The plaintiffs filed suit against both the at-fault driver and Snapchat on negligence
claims. Id. at 498, 357 Ga. App. at 498, 851 S.E.2d at 130.
110. Id., at 498, 851 S.E.2d at 130 (stating the plaintiffs alleged that the at-fault driver
drove “in excess of 100 miles per hour” so that she could capture the speed using the Speed
Filter).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 497, 851 S.E.2d at 130.
113. Id. at 499, 851 S.E.2d at 131. The court also noted that the risk-utility balancing
test from Banks v. ICI Americas, 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994), is the proper test for
evaluating negligent design defect claims.
114. Maynard, 357 Ga. App. at 502, 851 S.E.2d at 133.
115. Id. at 499, 851 S.E.2d at 131 (citing Dept. of Labor v. McConnell, 305 Ga. 812, 816,
828 S.E.2d 352, 358 (2019)).
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others.”116 The court noted that the manufacturer’s duty to exercise
reasonable care does not extend to safeguard against a third party’s
intentional misuse of the product.117 Chief Judge McFadden wrote a
scathing dissent criticizing the majority’s emphasis on accidental versus
intentional misuse.118 The Supreme Court of Georgia granted a writ of
certiorari in July and will hear oral arguments in October 2021.
G. Punitive Damages
In Reid v. Morris,119 the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether
an intoxicated person who was not the drunk driver in a car accident
could be considered an “active tort-feasor” under Georgia’s punitive
damages statute.120 Defendant Keith Stroud asked his drunk friend,
Lakenin Morris, to drive his car. Morris subsequently hit and injured the
plaintiff, Alonzo Reid.121 Although the trial court found that both
defendants were liable for Reid’s injuries and both acted with the
requisite state of mind to impose punitive damages under O.C.G.A.
§ 51-12-5.1(b),122 the court refused to order Stroud to pay punitive
damages based on the trial court’s understanding of prior court of appeals
interpretations123 of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f)124 holding that “[t]he ‘active
tortfeasor’ means the DUI driver and this is the only person the statute

116. Id. (quoting Stanley v. Garrett, 356 Ga. App. 706, 710, 848 S.E.2d 890, 894 (2020)).
117. Id. at 500, 851 S.E.2d at 131–32.
118. Id. at 504, 851 S.E.2d at 134 (McFadden, J., dissenting); see also Id. at 504, 851
S.E.2d at 135 (noting that the Georgia “Supreme Court has articulated the public policy of
Georgia by explicitly delineating a manufacturer’s duty in the context of products liability,
a duty that encompasses the foreseeable misuse of the product”) (citing Chrysler Corp. v.
Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 724, 450 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1994)).
119. 309 Ga. 230, 845 S.E.2d 590 (2020), (cert. was granted on April 22, 2020, No.
S20A0107).
120. Reid, 309 Ga. at 233, 845 S.E.2d at 594.
121. Id. at 230–31, 845 S.E.2d at 592.
122. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 (2021).
123. Reid, 309 Ga. at 231–32, 845 S.E.2d at 593 (see Capp v. Carlito’s Mexican Bar &
Grill #1, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 779, 655 S.E.2d 232 (2007); Corrugated Replacements, Inc. v.
Johnson, 340 Ga. App. 364, 797 S.E.2d 238 (2017)).
124. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f), as amended, provides as follows:
In a tort case in which the cause of action does not arise from product liability,
if it is found that the defendant acted, or failed to act, with the specific intent to
cause harm, or that the defendant acted or failed to act while under the influence
of alcohol, drugs other than lawfully prescribed drugs administered in
accordance with prescription, or any intentionally consumed glue, aerosol, or
other toxic vapor to that degree that his or her judgment is substantially
impaired, there shall be no limitation regarding the amount which may be
awarded as punitive damages against an active tort-feasor but such damages
shall not be the liability of any defendant other than an active tort-feasor.
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authorizes an award of punitive damages against.”125 The Supreme Court
of Georgia held that the trial court’s reasoning in failing to consider
awarding punitive damages against Stroud was erroneous. 126
Vacating the trial court’s decision, the supreme court explained that
“O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f) does not categorically bar an award of punitive
damages against Stroud, because the term ‘active tort-feasor’ . . . is not
necessarily limited to drunk drivers.”127 The statute, as amended in 1997,
includes defendants who were negligent while intoxicated to the degree
that their judgment was substantially impaired and provided that these
damages “shall not be the liability of any defendant other than an active
tort-feasor.”128 The effect of this amendment is that punitive damages
awards against defendants who were not active tort-feasors would be
limited by the $250,000 cap outlined in O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(g).129
As the court explained, the amended subsection (f) refers to more than
just DUI drivers; rather, plaintiffs “may seek an uncapped punitive
damages award against any defendant who was intoxicated to the degree
that his or her judgment was substantially impaired as long as that
defendant also was an active tort-feasor.”130 The text, due to the
distinction between defendants who “acted” and those who “failed to act,”
suggests that an active tort-feasor is “a defendant who engages in an
affirmative act of . . . tortious conduct, as opposed to a defendant whose
negligence consists of an omission to act . . . .”131 Therefore, to determine
whether uncapped punitive damages could be awarded against
defendants who were not the drunk driver in cases such as this one, trial
courts must consider “whether the defendant was intoxicated to the
degree that his judgment was substantially impaired” and whether his
conduct that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury was active or
passive.132
IV. CONCLUSION
The above cases and legislation have, in the Authors’ estimation, most
significantly affected trial practice and procedure in Georgia during the
Survey period. This Article, however, is not intended to be exhaustive of
all legal developments for this topic.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Reid, 309 Ga. at 232, 845 S.E.2d at 593.
Id.
Id. at 233, 845 S.E.2d at 594.
Id. at 236, 845 S.E.2d at 596 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f)).
Id. at 236–37, 845 S.E.2d at 596.
Id. at 237, 845 S.E.2d at 596.
Id. at 237, 845 S.E.2d at 596–97.
Id. at 238, 845 S.E.2d at 597.

